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The legal framework of international relief in situations of armed
conflict
1. Introduction
The point of view that I have chosen in order to outline the legal framework of
international relief is a very traditional one. Taking into consideration the existence of
a very large body of international rules, on the one hand, and the current volume of
humanitarian assistance activities, on the other, I propose to examine whether there
is a relationship between the law governing humanitarian assistance in time of armed
conflicts and the actual practice of the ICRC, the international organizations and the
non-governmental organizations involved in relief activities. More simply, the
question is the following: is international humanitarian law relevant to the activity of
the organizations concerned, and can it be assumed that these organizations are
interested in abiding by its rules, or is humanitarian law a branch of international law
whose constraints are applicable only to the ICRC?
Before I begin this talk, I would like to give a brief overview of international
humanitarian law.
International humanitarian law is part of public international law and is composed of
rules intended to alleviate the suffering of the victims of armed conflict. These rules
restrict the choice of the belligerents with regard to the means and methods of
combat they use and are therefore applicable to military operations as such. They
also protect persons who are in the power of the enemy, like prisoners of war or the
inhabitants of a occupied territory. Most of these rules are contained in the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and in the two Additional Protocols of 1977, all these
texts being international treaties.
International humanitarian law differs from human rights law. Unlike international
human rights law, it applies only in situations of armed conflict and therefore creates
obligations geared to the specific needs of the victims of armed conflict.
2. The position of international and non-governmental organizations under
international humanitarian law
In 1949, there were few international agencies in existence. Moreover, the
maintenance of peace, and not international relief, was considered as being the
primary aim of the organizations that had been set up just after the Second World
War. Although non-governmental organizations appeared on the scene of
international relations before intergovernmental organizations, there was at this time
considerable scope for charitable activities inside these organizations' own countries
of origin, and they were therefore not so much interested in external activities. It is
thus hardly surprising that Article 59 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which deals
with relief actions undertaken in favour of the civilian population of an occupied
territory, mentions, besides "impartial humanitarian organizations such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross", only the States. Article 23 of the same
Convention obliges States to allow the free passage of relief supplies to another
State, an obligation that is meaningful only if the States concerned would be tempted
not to authorize the passage of such goods, in particular in the event of a blockade.
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This provision therefore refers only to goods that can be sent by any individual or any
entity, and not to the personnel that are generally included in the concept of relief
"action".
Sufficient changes occurred between 1949 and 1977 to be reflected in the law. The
two 1977 Protocols contain almost identical texts whose wording corresponds to
present-day assistance procedures and whose content meets the expectations of the
States and the humanitarian organizations with regard to this new form of
international activity. Whereas Article 59 of the Fourth Geneva Convention relates
only to assistance in an occupied territory, Article 70 of Protocol I regulates relief
actions that take place within the national borders. This provision thus implies that in
certain circumstances a belligerent State must accept relief operations undertaken in
favour of its own population. Article 18 of Protocol II deals with relief actions in the
case of non-international armed conflict. It constitutes a major improvement over
Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions, as it creates the obligation for the
State concerned to give its consent if the civilian population, whether under its control
or otherwise, is in need of essential supplies and if the offer of relief satisfies the
conditions laid down by international humanitarian law.
The object of the obligations contained in Article 70 of Protocol I and Article 18 of
Protocol II is a "relief action", without any specification as to the entity that is
supposed to undertake such a relief action. The rules of interpretation nevertheless
require that Article 70 of Protocol I be read together with Article 59 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention; and Article 18 of Protocol II together with Article 70 of Protocol I.
This leads to a first conclusion, i.e. that, as well as the ICRC and any other impartial
humanitarian organization, States too can undertake relief actions in favour of the
population of a State party to a conflict. The opinion of legal experts must also be
taken into account, and that opinion generally closely follows State practice. In 1989,
the Institute of International Law stated in a resolution on the protection of human
rights and the principle of nonintervention in internal affairs of States, that an offer of
food or medical supplies by "a State, a group of States, an international organization
or an impartial humanitarian body such as the ICRC" cannot, if certain conditions are
fulfilled, be considered as unlawful intervention in the internal affairs of the State
concerned. This leads to a second conclusion, i.e., that not only the States and the
ICRC but also the international organizations can carry out a relief action within the
meaning of the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law.
Are non-governmental organizations excluded from the application of international
humanitarian law? Even though the 1989 resolution of the Institute of International
Law does not mention them, I would argue that the non-governmental character of an
agency should not affect the duty of the State concerned to accept an offer of relief
that fulfills the necessary conditions.
2. Concessions and limits to State sovereignty in the regulation of
international relief
Article 70 of Protocol I, as well as the resolution of the Institute of International Law
mentioned above, provides for an offer of services. Does this mean that the
government concerned has the discretionary power to accept or refuse that offer?
Having regard to the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law, the
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answer is certainly in the negative. The government must agree to the beneficiaries
receiving food and medical supplies, if the conditions required by the law are fulfilled.
Is the condition of an offer of services a pointless concession to State sovereignty? If
the right interpretation is given regarding the power of the State concerned to refuse
the offer, that question should not be answered too quickly.
It is true that no mention of an offer of services is made either in Article 23 or in
Article 59 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. But, as we have seen, Article 23
provides only for the free passage of relief supplies, and not for a relief operation
such as those that are undertaken today. Article 59 is worded in a rather imperative
way; but the obligation it creates is aimed at the Occupying Power and governs
relations between this authority and a foreign population. However, although the
Occupying Power seems to have no choice other than to accept the proposed
action - insofar as this action is in conformity with the usual conditions laid down by
international humanitarian law - due consideration must be given to the fact that,
unlike the case with actions undertaken in the State's own territory, supervision of
the distribution of relief by the ICRC or the Protecting Power is mandatory.
Notwithstanding these two examples, it is doubtful whether an undertaking on the
scale of a relief operation requiring material and human resources such as means
of transport, means of communication and personnel involved in the evaluation of
needs and the transport and distribution of relief supplies, could take place without
the agreement of the local authorities. We can therefore conclude that although the
condition of the offer of services is included in the law as a concession to State
sovereignty, from the practical point of view an undertaking of this type without
some form of prior negotiation would seem unthinkable.
The government must accept the offer of services if the action proposed is of a
humanitarian, non-discriminatory and impartial nature. It should be noted that the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 do not mention these conditions. The fact that they are
mentioned in the 1977 must, however, not be considered as a change in the law.
Indeed, as seen earlier, control of the distribution of relief by an impartial and
humanitarian organization such as the ICRC, or by the Protecting Power, is already
mandatory in the 1949 text.
Both Article 70 of Protocol I and Article 18 of Protocol II set the condition that the
civilian population must be in need of supplies essential for its survival. This condition
must not be given too much importance. On the one hand, an offer that does not
correspond to the needs of the civilian population would probably not be in
accordance with the principle of humanity. On the other hand, as violations of
international humanitarian law do unfortunately take place during armed conflicts,
such situations usually lead to a rapid deterioration of the population's standard of
living. However, present-day possibilities in the field of international relief and law
that have resulted therefrom the general duty of the see that its own population is Dr.
Kouchner has pointed out, governed by the principle of the developments in the




If the proposed action is humanitarian, non-discriminatory and impartial, the offer of
services cannot be considered as unlawful intervention in the internal affairs of the
State concerned. This principle applies, according to the legal experts and to the
International Court of Justice (see the "Nicaruagua" case), whatever the situation.
It is extremely difficult to define the prohibitions and the injunctions that are implied
by each principle separately. Is discriminatory behaviour humanitarian? According to
the Commentary on Article 70 of Protocol I, impartiality is "a moral quality which must
be present in the individual or institution called upon to act for the benefit of those
who are suffering" (p. 818, para. 2800). Together with the condition of the
humanitarian nature of assistance and the principle of non-discrimination, it
guarantees that relief work is intended solely for the purpose of assisting the victims
according to their needs and of giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress.
Indeed, a relief operation whose purposes are not exclusively humanitarian would not
comply with the condition of neutrality and would therefore not be in accordance with
the said principles.
Article 70 of Protocol I not only creates an obligation for the State to accept an offer
of relief when certain conditions are met; it also sets out, together with Article 71, the
obligations that derive from its consent. It is interesting to note that, whereas the
party to the conflict shall in no way whatsoever delay the for-warding of relief
consignments, "except in cases of urgent necessity in the interest of the civilian
population concerned", the participation of relief personnel is subject to the approval
of the party concerned. Once their participation is accepted, their activity can be
limited or their movements restricted - temporarily - only in case of imperative military
necessity. The relief personnel, for their part, must not exceed the terms of their
mission and shall take account of the security requirements of the party; otherwise
their mission may be terminated.
These rules, like other relevant provisions of Protocol I, constitute a prime example of
the balance struck by the States between considerations of humanity and military
necessity. In general, assistance should not be presented as being in conflict with
sovereignty. Relief operations need the cooperation and the good will of the local
authorities. Efforts should be aimed at convincing all concerned that international law
reflects sovereignty and that there should be no contradiction between the rule of law
and that sovereignty.
4. Means of implementing international humanitarian law
The refusal of a relief action in situations where the conditions laid down by the law
are fulfilled is an act contrary to international humanitarian law and must be dealt with
as such. This leads us to examine what means can be used in order to prevent or
repress violations of international humanitarian law.
I am not going to elaborate on the subject of the measures that can or must be taken
to prevent violations of humanitarian law. This branch of international law suffers
from the fact that there is widespread ignorance of its rules, also among the public.
The United Kingdom, thanks notably to the efforts of the British Red Cross, is one of
the few exceptions. Dissemination of humanitarian law should be developed, and
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anyone complaining about non-observance of its rules should be encouraged to ask
for wider dissemination of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols.
According to the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, which have been approved by the States, the ICRC must work for the
faithful application of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts.
This sentence reflects in a general way the mandate conferred on the ICRC by
international humanitarian law. Indeed, in international armed conflicts, the ICRC has
the right to visit prisoners of war and to have access to civilian persons protected by
the Fourth Geneva Convention (for example, inhabitants of occupied territory). In
exercising these rights, the ICRC is entitled to supervise the application of the
Geneva Conventions by the parties to an international conflict. It has also the
responsibility to perform the functions of the Central Tracing Agency, i.e., the
centralization of all information regarding prisoners of war and civilians interned or
arrested and the forwarding of this information to their countries of origin, so that the
authorities can inform their relatives of their whereabouts.
In situations of non-international armed conflict, the ICRC has a right of initiative that
allows it to carry out similar tasks in favour of the victims.
Thus we see that the ICRC is entitled by the law to engage, as soon as an armed
conflict arises, in activities that are essentially aimed at preventing violations of
international humanitarian law. When necessary, it can make representations to the
parties to a conflict to encourage them to act in accordance with the rules of
international humanitarian law.
Besides the ICRC, the United Nations, and, more especially, the bodies that have set
up to promote human rights can also contribute to improving respect for
humanitarian law. States, for their part, can discourage a third State from violating
humanitarian law by exerting diplomatic pressure or taking other measures in
conformity with international law. The ICRC is nevertheless the sole body that is
expressly entitled to act in favour of the victims of an armed conflict and which has
the duty to do so in every situation qualified as an armed conflict. This means that its
activities must be based on purely humanitarian considerations and have to respect
the principle of impartiality.
Assistance that is not provided in compliance with the principles of humanity, non-
discrimination and impartiality does not respect the framework of humanitarian law
and has consequences that endanger the aims of this law as well as the values it
sets out to protect. It is therefore quite understandable that the rules concerning
international assistance to victims of war also provide for the control of the
distribution of relief, and that the body the States may ask to exercise such control is
the same as the one which is entitled to supervise the application of humanitarian
law, that is, the ICRC (and the Protecting Power, should one have been designated
by the parties to the conflict).
5. The remllation of international relief during non-international armed
conflicts
As far as non-international armed conflicts are concerned, the situation is a little
different, as there is no institution expressely empowered to monitor the application
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of humanitarian law by the parties. The ICRC of course has a right of initiative and
under the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement has
the duty to do its utmost to ensure respect for humanitarian law, whatever the nature
of the conflict. However, even if State practice shows that the principle of the
presence of the ICRC in internal armed conflicts is recognized, the means to be
employed in ensuring observance of humanitarian rules in such conflicts have yet to
be clearly determined.
This situation is paradoxical, since on the one hand these conflicts are now
predominant, and on the other, they usually give rise to numerous and grave
violations of humanitarian law.
The underdeveloped state - so to speak - of the law applicable to internal armed
conflicts is also apparent from the fact that very few rules, in comparison to the
hundreds that must be observed in international armed conflicts, govern this type of
conflict. Indeed, only Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of the 1949 and
Protocol II additional to those Conventions, to which almost a hundred States are
now party, apply to these situations.
As this kind of conflict is now the most common, the law applicable to the non-
international armed conflicts constitutes the legal framework of most contemporary
relief operations in favour of conflict victims. In this respect, Article 18 of Protocol II,
which is the sole provision dealing with international relief under the law applicable to
non-international armed conflicts, deserves special attention.
This provision is formulated in a very similar way to Article 70 of Protocol I, and the
same general conditions for the legality of an international relief action are laid down.
However, Article 18 has been criticised for the fact that the authority that must give its
consent to an offer of services is the legal government, even if the action proposed is
in favour of the civilian population of an area controlled by rebels. A complete
transposition of the rules applicable to international armed conflict seems, however,
given the nature of internal armed conflict, difficult. A resolution adopted recently by
the Council of Delegates, a body composed of representatives of the ICRC, of the
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and of the Federation of these Societies,
urges the States "to allow free passage of medicines and medical equipment,
foodstuffs, clothing and other supplies essential to the survival of the civilian
population of another Contracting Party, even if the latter is its adversary, it being
understood that they are entitled to ensure that the consignments are not diverted
from their destination".
These considerations must not obscure the fact that, if consent is not given in a
situation where the conditions for a relief action are fulfilled, such refusal constitutes
a violation of humanitarian law. Means that are compatible with international law and
that do not jeopardize its aims and values can be used to convince the party
concerned to act in conformity with the law. Refusal to accept a relief action should
nevertheless be treated like another breach of humanitarian law. There is no reason
for it to give rise to a stronger reaction on the part of the international community than
others violations. On the contrary, it could be said that the civilian population is often
in need of relief supplies because of previous violations of humanitarian law, leading
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to dependence on international relief, and frequently those previous violations did not
arouse the interest of the international community.
6. Conclusion
International relief during armed conflicts enters in a legal framework which ensures
that relief benefits only the victims of the armed conflict and does not jeopardize the
aims and values safeguarded by the Geneva Conventions and their Additional
Protocols. If that is the case, international relief contributes to one of the most
generous fields of human activity, that is, alleviating the suffering of the victims of
war. The solutions to problems arising out of a situation of armed conflict are as
interdependent as the problems themselves. What is needed is a comprehensive
approach that takes into account all the factors that hinder, or on the contrary favour,
the observance of humanitarian law.
Denise Plattner Geneva, 25 March 1992
